This article provides new empirical results regarding the demand for and supply of title, the impact of title on land value, and its effects on agricultural investment on Brazilian frontiers. We present survey data from 1992 and 1993 from the state of Para on the characteristics of the settlers, land tenure, land agencies involved, land values, and investment. We also present data from the Brazilian agricultural censuses from 1940 through 1985, with observations at the municfpio (county) level to examine the development of property rights to land in the southern state of Parana during the agricultural boom between 1940 and 1970 and in the Amazon state of Para during the period of rapid migration to the region after 1970. Examining property rights in frontier regions allows us to follow the rise in land values with movement toward a market center, the associated increase in demand for title, and the response of government to those demands. The empirical findings generally support our predictions regarding the effects of title and investment on land value; the role of expected change in value in increasing demand for title; and the contribution of title in promoting land-specific investment. Our results address both broad questions of institutional change and narrower issues of economic development.
Introduction
Recent work in economics, law, and political science has directed attention to the importance of a society's institutional structure in determining incentives for economic behavior and performance. 1 Although much of the focus of this literature has been on the firm and other organizational and political institutions within developed economies, analyses increasingly have turned to questions of economic development.
2 Indeed, the existence of property-rights institutions and their impact on market expansion, investment, and resource use has become a central issue in attempts to explain differences in economic growth. 3 Further, the absence of well-defined property rights is cited as a key contributor to rapid deforestation and other examples of "wasteful" land use in developing areas. 4 As a case in point, Brazil is the country most often cited for deforestation and other alleged environmentally damaging actions in the Amazon, and unclear property rights are suggested as a source of the problem.
5
Despite the importance of property-rights institutions as a basis for developing markets and encouraging long-term investment, more empirical work is necessary to better understand the development of property rights, including the supply of formal title by governments, the effects of title on asset values, and the ways in which having title may change economic behavior.
6 Accordingly, additional research on property-rights institutions addresses both broad 1. The literature is large and wide-ranging, and a few citations cannot do justice to the range of work that exists. However, representative citations include the studies in Empirical Studies in Institutional Change (Alston, Eggertsson, and North, 1996) ; the special issue of the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (Furubotn and Richter, 1993) ; the readings edited by Williamson and Winter (1991) ; the articles on political organizations in the "Conference on "The Organization of Political Institutions," special issue, 1990, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization; as well as Becker (1983) and North (1990) . Levy and Spiller (1994) use transaction cost economics to analyze the determinants of performance of privatized utilities in five countries where institutional conditions vary.
2. For example, see Ostrom (1990); Feder and Feeny (1991) ; Hoff, Braverman, and Stiglitz (1993); and Besley (1994) .
3. Recognition of the importance of property rights in economic behavior follows from the work of Demsetz (1967) , North (1981) , Anderson and Hill (1975, 1991) , and others. Barro (1991) examines differences in property rights security in cross-country growth comparisons.
4. For discussion, see Berge, Ott, and Stenseth (1994) ; Gillis and Repetto (1989) ; and Deacon (forthcoming-a, b).
5. See Binswanger (1989) and Mahar (1989) . 6. For summary of the literature, see Eggertsson (1990) . There have been analyses of propertyrights institutions both in contemporary developing areas and in an historical context. For analyses in contemporary development, see Feder and Feeny (1991) ; Besley (1994) ; Ostrom (1990) ; Hazell and Place (1993) ; Migot-Adholla, Hazell, Blarel, and Place (1991); and Ensminger (1995) . Besley provides an analysis with respect to tenure and investment in Ghana. Feder and Onchan (1987) and Feder, Onchan, Chalamwong, and Hongladrarom (1988) compare the performance of farmers and land values on titled and nontitled land in Thailand. These studies examine the nature and impact of tenure in more or less settled regions. Our analysis is of frontiers, allowing us to examine the development of property institutions as land values rise. For more historical studies and contemporary natural resource problems, see Libecap (1989) and Kantor (1995) . Alston, Libecap, and Mueller (1996) provide a discussion of property rights and violence in Brazil. questions of institutional change and as well as narrower issues of economic development.
In this article, we provide new empirical results regarding the demand for and supply of title, the impact of title on land value, and its effects on agricultural investment on Brazilian frontiers. For a micro analysis of the development of property-rights institutions, we first present household data for 206 small landholders from a survey conducted by the authors in 1992 and 1993 at four frontier sites in the state of Pard. These data include the characteristics of the settlers, the nature of their land tenure, the identity of the land agencies involved, land values, and investment. To examine the development of property rights over time and across a broader region, we use census data from the Brazilian agricultural censuses from 1940 through 1985, with observations at the municiipo (county) level. Specifically, we examine the emergence and impact of land titles on two agricultural frontiers: in the southern state of Parana during the agricultural boom between 1940 and 1970 and in the Amazon state of Pard during the period of rapid migration to the region after 1970. By analyzing census data across time, we can observe much greater variation in land value, tenure, and investment than is possible with household survey data, which do not exist over such a long time period or for comparable frontier regions. As such, we can determine whether the development of property rights to land changed over time as relative prices changed. If the results are similar for both data sets, we can have greater confidence in the robustness of the tests of the theoretical relationships between property rights and behavior.
In our analyses, the frontier is defined with respect to distance from a market center and is the point where the net present value of land use just covers the opportunity cost of the claimant. By examining the frontier, we can follow the rise in land values as one moves toward a market center, the associated increase in demand for title, and the response of government to those demands.
Although frontiers often are associated with the nineteenth century or earlier, there have been significant migrations to previously-unoccupied land in the twentieth century too. For example, there was rapid settlement of unoccupied government land in the state of Parand after 1940. The population of the state rose from approximately 1.2 million in 1940 to nearly 7 million by 1970 . Between 1940 and 1960 , the amount of agricultural land almost doubled, and the number of farms increased more than fourfold. Migration to the Brazilian Amazon has occurred since the late 1960s, often through directed government colonization projects. For example, the population of the state of Par£ in the northeast Amazon grew from just over 2 million in 1970 to more than 4 million in 1985. 7 The amount of land in farms doubled in the 1960s and again in the 1970s, and the number of farms rose sharply. Beginning in earnest in the 1960s, new lands were opened for private claiming through construction of road systems, such as the TransAmazon and Belem-Brasflia highways.
Land exchange contracts and titles are recognized throughout the country and are defendable in court. Hence, they provide security for those more remote, potential purchasers (say, from more settled areas), who might be interested in purchasing frontier land. Absent titles, individual holdings are based on squatter claims and subject to local agreements and practices. Potential purchasers, who are not part of such arrangements, may have little understanding of local conditions or confidence in the property rights they provide. Although there is a market for land without title, having title is perceived as an advantage by settlers, as it broadens the range of potential purchasers. 9 Finally, consider the ability of title to reduce private enforcement costs. With state-recognized title, landowners can appeal to the police to patrol property boundaries and to evict trespassers. Further, the judicial system can be used to issue injunctions against squatters who invade private property. A review of land-conflict records held by the state land agency ITERPA (the State of Parl Land Institute), the Parl Pastoral Land Commission (1989) , and other federal and state government agencies shows that having title facilitates the introduction of the rule of law in resolving land disputes.
On Brazilian frontiers, government land (terra devoluta) is open for private claiming and titling, much as it was in the United States in the nineteenth century.
10 Generally, as with the U. S. Homestead Act of 1862, the land claim must be occupied by the claimant and improved for agricultural use for a prescribed amount of time-one year for claims on government land or five years for claims to private land based on adverse possession. Once surveyed, land claims are filed with government land agencies that monitor compliance with the land laws, process title applications, and ultimately issue title.
To initiate the titling process, claimants generally must organize collectively, travel to a local agency office, and formally request surveys and documentation of their land claims. Group organization is necessary because land agencies usually wait until a threshold number of requests are made before traveling to the site. When they respond, agency officials take a census of settlers in the area, survey and mark claims, and grant claimants an authorization to occupy, 9. Field notes by Ricardo Tarifa, May 18, 1993, indicate that between 40 and 50 percent of the colonists in TucumS had sold land, even without title, between Tarifa's visits in 1991 and 1993. The sales appeared to be to other colonists in the community. Similarly, in the community of Nova Alianc,a, Tarifa noted active land exchanges among small landholders, none of whom had title. Active land markets exist in all the survey sites.
10. In some cases, private land (generally on very large ranches) that is not put to beneficial use can be invaded by squatters (posseims) and claimed by them. Forested land is particularly susceptible to invasion by squatters because of the appearance of nonuse, the difficulty of monitoring occupancy by squatters, and the attraction to itinerant loggers, who build roads to access valuable species and thereby provide access for squatters. Where invasions occur, the government attempts to enforce title for private land. If land is of low value, the formal owner may not object to the invasion. Where land values are higher, however, owners will attempt to evict or to negotiate either a voluntary exodus or a transfer to the squatters. The government may purchase the land from the large landowner or negotiate payment from the landowner to the squatters for their improvements and assist them in locating other lands for settlement. We are addressing this process in ongoing research.
an authorizagdo do ocupagdo or licensa de ocupagao. The authorizations are forwarded to the state or federal government, depending on the government unit involved, for final recording. Normally, title applications can be processed within two to five years, but if the initial claimant moves to a different site and sells the claim, the title application must be reprocessed, extending the titling time."
Within Parana\ the state government had jurisdiction over land settlement, except in the western municfpios, where there was dispute over jurisdiction between the federal and state governments (Foweraker, 1981: 88-92) . This conflict may have delayed the assignment of clear property rights to land and encouraged conflict among settlers over claims (Westphalen, Machado, and Balhana, 1968) . We examine this issue in the empirical analysis below.
In some cases, particularly in Parana", private land companies obtained large tracts of land from the state government, recruited settlers, and issued titles. For example, the Companhia de Terras do Norte do Parana^ obtained 12,463 square kilometers of land in the north, sold urban and rural lots to settlers, and extended railways and roads. The municfpios included in the company's holdings accounted for more than 12 percent of the size of Parana" in I960.
12 Because the company gained clear legal title to its land before attracting colonists and was a residual claimant in the titling process, it may have transferred title more quickly and completely than did the state government (Nicholls and Paiva, 1969: 27-30; Foweraker, 1981: 130) . We also address this issue in the empirical analysis below.
In Pari, government policy on the frontier has been different in a number of ways from that in Parana^ which may have affected the titling process and hence the results of the statistical tests presented in Section 6. First, in Pari both the federal and state governments have been involved in titling. 13 In municfpios with largely federal land, the federal land agency, INCRA (National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform), processed land claims, whereas in munidpios with state lands, the state land agency, ITERPA, administered private claims. Because ITERPA was subject to more local political pressures to assign titles, it likely did so more rapidly and completely than did the federal agency, INCRA. ITERPA processed title applications according to state election cycles, with officials promising titles in exchange for electoral support (Pinto, 1980: 11. If the settler improves and occupies the land, agency officials will return and grant a provisional title, while final title is being processed in Brasflia or Belem. If, when the agency returns to the colony, the claimant has moved on or "sold" his squatter claim, the process of titling begins again. The agency tends to acknowledge the new claimant who holds the authorization or provisional title so long as the individual is a genuine settler and not a large land speculator.
12. This percentage was calculated using the map in Nicholls and Paiva (1969: 28) and the area of the municfpios within the company's jurisdiction from IBGE, Anudrio Eslatislico do Brasil (1965: 42^»3) .
13. The federal government claimed that state lands were essential to national security. This action was followed in 1971 by decree law 1164, by which the federal government took control of all land up to 100 kilometers on either side of all roads constructed, under construction, or projected.
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A second difference between the land claiming processes in Parana and Para is that as land values rose in Parana private migration decisions drove claiming activities, while in Para migration was stimulated by directed (subsidized) colonization programs of the federal government. Investment in infrastructure by the federal government and subsidized colonies brought settlers to the Amazon before land values had risen to a level that otherwise would have attracted migrants.
14 Further, in Para declining budgets for land agencies limited their ability to process title applications. Budget problems especially affected IN-CRA, whose budget peaked in 1976, leading to a lag in the assignment of title (Yokota, 1981: 33) .
A third difference between settlement and titling in the two states is violent conflict among competing claimants. Although there was confusion over property rights to land in the western municfpios in Parana where the federal and state governments competed for jurisdiction, in Par3 there has been violence between small landholders and ranchers, particularly in southeastern Pard along the Bel6m-Brasflia highway in the municfpio of Conceicao do Araguaia and others near Marabi Ranchers have been subsidized by the Superintendency for the Development of Amazonia (SUDAM), a federal agency that administered a series of credit benefits and fiscal incentives (Schneider, 1994: 2-6) , and settlement by small landholders has been encouraged by investment in infrastructure by the federal government and by colonization projects organized by INCRA. With the census data we can examine the effects on the titling process of conflicting government jurisdiction in Paranci and violent conflict over land in Para. Figure 1 presents the analytical framework for the empirical analysis. In frontier areas, distance to market is a primary determinant of land value. Transportation 14. Real land values in Par* in 1970 were less than half those in Parana in 1940 (in constant 1970 prices), and Parti land prices in 1980 remained less than half of ParanA land prices in 1950. These data are from the Brazilian Agricultural Censuses, Parana (1940: 244; 1950: 184); Parti (1980: 282) . The factors used in converting nominal prices to 1970 prices can be obtained from the authors. Beginning in 1966 and continuing into the 1970s, the federal government provided tax and credit incentives to private firms for investment in the Amazon. These initiatives were joined in the early 1970s by road-building programs, pledges of other infrastructure investment, and directed colonization efforts. INCRA organized colonization projects, especially along the TransAmazon highway, bringing colonists from southern Brazil with pledges of infrastructure and credit. In 1971, the Program for National Integration (PIN) was launched to bring colonists to the Amazon. In Parti, INCRA established three colonization areas: Marabi, Altamira, and Itaituba. A goal of placing 100,000 families, each with 100-hectare plots, in organized colonies and planned urban centers was established, although not achieved (Fearnside, 1986: 19-20; Wood and Wilson, 1984: 142; Sawyer, 1984: 189) . For an assessment of government settlement projects, see Moran (1989b) . In 1974, a policy shift led to greater emphasis on colonization by large ranchers in plots of 500 to 3,000 hectares and less on small landholder settlement (Feamside, 1986: 21) . costs grow with distance from the market/administrative center, reducing the net profitability of economic activities. At some distance, transportation costs are high enough to make economic activity unfeasible, since the returns do not cover the opportunity costs of the marginal laborer. Hence, the land is not occupied and remains in forest. This land is beyond the economic frontier. This discussion suggests that, all else constant, those who settle the frontier will be those who have relatively lower opportunity costs, and limited education and experience.
Analytical Framework
In Figure l (a), the horizontal axis represents the distance from the market/administrative center, and the vertical axis reflects the market value of a hectare of land; land is assumed to be homogeneous. Value is determined by the production possibilities of the land, which are negatively related to distance and positively related to inherent quality, land-specific investments, and market exchange. Title also adds value to land. Formal, state-enforced title represents the most secure form of property rights to land. Title signals government endorsement of an individual's land claim; that is, with title, ownership is enforced by the courts and the police power of the state. Under these circumstances, title provides claimants with the long-term security of ownership and the collateral necessary to access formal capital markets for land-specific investments. Formal, enforced title also reduces the private costs of defending claims, such as private marking and patrolling of claims, because the state assumes many of those responsibilities. Finally, by signaling government recognition of current land ownership, a title increases the exchange value of land by widening the market. Buyers from more distant areas, who may have more high-valued uses for the land and access to capital markets, have the assurance that land exchange contracts will be recognized by the courts and enforced by the state. Absent title, land exchange occurs in more narrow markets, among local buyers and sellers who are familiar with informal local property rights arrangements.
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These regional practices typically are not enforced by the courts or understood by potential buyers from more distant areas.
15
In Figure l(a) , the intercepts, V, and V nl , reflect, respectively, the net present values of land with or without title at the market center, point A. At the market center, titled and nontitled land have different net present values because of differences in productivity-enhancing investments, exchange possibilities, and private enforcement costs. Indeed, at point A, where transportation costs are the lowest, the contribution of title to land value is the greatest. Potentially high-valued but nontitled land at the market center will be subject to more intense competition, raising private enforcement costs and increasing uncertainty of control. These conditions reduce investment, exchange, and production possibilities, thereby lowering potential land values. By contrast, with titled land, the state assumes most of the enforcement costs, guarantees ownership, and thereby promotes investment, exchange, and production. These activities raise land values and shift the value from V nl to V,.
Moving from the market center at point A toward the frontier, the contribution of title declines. With higher transportation costs, land values are lower as the potential for exchange and production declines. Competition for ownership is reduced, requiring less state enforcement of title, and private enforcement costs decline. Hence, the titled value line has a negative slope with respect to distance, and the slope is steeper than that of the nontitled value line. At some remote distance, D, the two value lines converge.
Figure l(b), illustrates individual demand for title. The vertical axis is the difference between the values of titled and nontitled land, that is, V, -V nl . This difference reflects the added value of title to the individual claimant at different distances from the market/administrative center. In the figure, the difference in the land value with and without title declines with distance. Importantly, the position of the curve may shift across individuals. Those with more education, fanning experience, and wealth likely will receive higher added values of title at any distance than will those with less human and physical capital because the former may be able to take better advantage of the opportunities made possible by title. We test for these effects below.
The private costs of obtaining title likely rise with distance, because claimants must travel to the administrative center to record land claims and to file for title as well as to lobby for titling services. Although, we do not have information on the exact nature of the individual cost function, there will be a distance at which the expected added benefits from having title are equal to the private costs for each claimant of obtaining it. Beyond that point, individuals will hold their claims as squatters, whereas at locations closer to the market/administrative center, claimants will seek formal title. In Figure l (b) we represent this threshold distance by point E.
15. In the nineteenth-century on the U.S. mining frontier, the need to obtain formal judicial recognition of mineral claims was a major reason for the establishment of government institutions (seeLibecap, 1978) .
The human and physical capital assets of claimants may lower the private costs of obtaining title and thereby shift the position of point E. Claimants with more education, wealth, and experience are more apt to know how to use the bureaucracy to their advantage and to be able to lobby politicians to provide and police land titles. In addition, government policy will affect the private costs of obtaining title. Government policy determines who receives title (through the allocation formula), when it is assigned (through marking and survey policies, pricing, and other settlement requirements), whether it is secure (through enforcement practices), and how conflicts are adjudicated (through the police and courts). Each of these is determined through the political process. Government may lower the private costs of obtaining title by subsidizing titles. For example, politicians may travel to the site and exchange titles with farmers for promises of electoral support. Alternatively, factors like the existence of multiple land agencies, confused jurisdiction over government land, violent conflict, and fluctuating agency budgets may delay the provision of tenure services and raise the private costs to individual claimants. These conditions may shift point E toward the market center, thereby delaying the assignment of title.
In Brazil, state and federal agencies have jurisdiction in different areas, have different constituents, and have varying budget environments. State agencies, in response to local constituent demands, may be more likely to subsidize the private costs of obtaining title, whereas federal land agencies may be less responsive to local demand and more vulnerable to changing national budget priorities. Even in the absence of subsidies, it seems likely that it would be more costly for local squatter organizations to effectively lobby politicians in remote Brasflia, which is the nation's capital and headquarters for INCRA, than in comparatively nearby Bele'm, the state capital for Para and headquarters for the state land agency, ITERPA. Hence, the private costs of obtaining title from state government land agencies may be less than those for obtaining title from federal agencies.
Governments can transfer some of the costs of titling by selling land in large blocks to private companies that in turn subdivide and title the land for agricultural development, so long as government will recognize and enforce the titles. Since private companies are residual claimants from land sales, they may have more incentive than government officials to assign titles quickly and at low cost to settlers. In Section 6, we test for these different effects that may shift the costs of obtaining title and hence the threshold point E.
Characteristics of the Survey and Census Data
The analysis of the development and impact of property rights to land employs two data sets: one from the authors' survey of 206 small landholders in four sites in the state of Para, near the communities of Altamira, Tucuma, S3o Felix, and Tailandia; the other from the Brazilian Agricultural Censuses from 1940 through 1970 for ParanS and from 1970 through 1985 for Para. 16 The 16. Because of missing data, four observations are dropped, three from Altamira and one from Tucumi survey data allow us to examine the determinants of title, investment, and land value at the individual level. The mix of sites allows us to analyze the effects of different agency jurisdictions and settlement processes: Altamira, on the TransAmazon highway, was one of the original planned colonization sites by ENCRA; Tucuma was a private settlement area that reverted to INCRA's jurisdiction after an invasion; and Sao Felix and Tailandia were settlement sites organized by ITERPA. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the pooled survey sample. Because of the large number of variables, we do not provide a similar table of descriptive statistics for the census data.
17
The census data are by municfpio (county). In our data set, there are 79 municfpios in Para in the four census periods, 18 whereas in Parand the number of municfpios grows from 49 in 1940 to 288 by 1970, through subdivision of existing municfpios. In general, the data are averages for each municfpio, and they include average land value per hectare, distance from the municfpio capita] to the state capital (Curitiba in Parana and Bele"m in Para) as a measure of remoteness from the market and administrative center, the proportion of municfpio farmers with title, average farm size in the municfpio, average soil quality for the municfpio, population density, and average investment per hectare in the municfpio.
19 Analysis of these census data allows us to test for the broad determinants of property rights to land as they emerge over time.
17. Descriptive statistics for both states for the eight census years can be obtained from the authors.
18. For 1970 for Parf, we have only 78 municfpios because of problems with the census measure of investment in one municfpio.
19. As we describe below, some of the variables, such as investment, are constructed using census data. In all cases that involved prices it was necessary to deflate. All values for Parana are given in 1970 cruzeiros and all values for Parf in 1985 cruzeiros. The index used to deflate prices was the General Price Index calculated by Fundacao Getiilio Vargas. For the period 1940-1944, the price index for Sao Paulo is that found in IBGE, Eslatlsticas Histdricas do Brasil, (1990: 226-36, 285-86) .
Before turning to the analysis, we describe each of the survey sites in order to better understand the assignment of title and its possible effects. Settlement along the TransAmazon highway running east from Altamira was to be a model of organized colonization by the federal government, beginning in 1970 with the first Plan for National Integration (PIN).
20 PIN called for construction of the TransAmazon and other regional highways and for colonization of lands made accessible by new roads. A 10 kilometer strip of land on either side of the highway was set aside for small fanners, who could receive up to 100-hectare plots. Infrastructure was to be provided. By the late 1970s, however, federal priorities had changed, and far fewer settlers were brought to the region than was originally planned (Butler, 1985) . Nevertheless, individual settlement did occur at intervals along the highway, running east from the city of Altamira and along rough side roads that were constructed by logging companies. Many of those roads extended 30 to 60 kilometers from the TransAmazon highway, some as far as 120 kilometers.
The sample includes 47 farmers, scattered along the TransAmazon highway and side roads at intervals of 18,27,55,105, and 160 kilometers from Altamira, a city of 20,000 to 30,000 people.
21 These interview points were based on the existence of farms and feeder roads along the TransAmazon. This procedure was used to capture the effect of distance from the market as a major determinant of land value, titling, and investment Mean farm size in our sample is 132 hectares, with 10 hectares the minimum and 600 the maximum. Eighty-two percent of the farmers have title to their land. By 1993, farmers had been on their plots for 15 years on average, suggesting that most arrived during the directed colonization period in the mid-1970s. Mean reported land value per hectare is $60. INCRA was to provide settlers with title within two to five years of settlement, but after 1976, due to declining budgets, the agency processed applications more slowly (Moran, 1984: 291) . Altamira is used as the baseline in the pooled regressions of survey data reported below.
Another INCRA site is near TucumiL, which began as a private colonization effort by CONSAG (Construtora Andrade Gutierrez), a large private construction firm that built highway PA-270 to link the area with PA-150 and the Beldm-Brasflia highway (Butler, 1985) . CONSAG recruited farmers from southern Brazil, beginning in 1981. After invasion of unoccupied areas in 1985, the company abandoned the project, and it eventually reverted to INCRA. Our sample includes 54 small farmers chosen randomly at various distances along two roads from the community of Tucum §, which has 5,000 to 10,000 people. Mean distance from Tucum2 is 26 kilometers. Thirty-two percent of the farmers in the sample have title, with the remainder occupying their claims as squatters. Mean farm size is 94 hectares, and mean per hectare farm value is $237. On average settlers have been on site for five years.
The third site is administered by ITERPA along state highway PA-150 from 20. See Moran (1984: 287) , Feamside (1986) , and Schmink and Wood (1992: 70 The next ITERPA site is near the community of SSo Felix, with fewer than 7,000 people in the area.
22 SSo Felix is a very small town with little infrastructure, and the ITERPA colony stretches 35 kilometers along the Xingu river. The closest market town is Tucum2. We surveyed 46 small landholders at two sites, one 45 minutes down river at a colony, Santa Rosa, and another five hours up river at Chadazinho. ITERPA has been active in assigning title in the area. Fifty-nine percent of those interviewed have title to their claims. Average value of land is $ 16 per hectare, the lowest of the interview sites, mean distance to market is 153 kilometers, the furthest for the survey. The settlers' mean time on the plot is 6 years.
Estimation
The analytical framework suggests the following system of equations for analyzing the determinants of land value, title, and investment on the frontier. These equations make use of the variables available to us in the Brazilian census and in our survey. For the estimations based on census data, we use OLS (ordinary least squares) and a log-linear specification for the land value and investment equations. 23 For those based on survey data, we use a log-linear 22. Field notes by Ricardo Tarifa, May 31, 1993, and the IBGE 1985 Census. 23. To decide whether to use a linear or log-linear specification for the value of land and investment equations in the four census periods in each state and for the survey data, we performed a test proposed by Davidson and Mackinnon (1981) . Of the 8 equations estimated for each state, the test either led to the rejection of the linear specification (9 of the 16 estimations) or was inconclusive regarding the use of the linear or log-linear specification (5 of the 16 estimations). In only two cases (one in each state) was the log-linear specification rejected. We used the procedure outlined by Breusch and Pagan (1979) to test for heteroskedasticity in the census estimations and corrected for it as necessary. Where heteroskedasticity was found, the estimation was corrected by using White's (1980) consistent estimator of the covariance matrix. The problem was greatest in the Parand estimations, where 10 of the 12 runs required correction. For the Part estimations, only 3 of the 12 runs required correction, 2 in the early value runs and 1 in the early investment estimation. The title equation for the census data, where the proportion of municfpio fanners with title is the dependent variable, was estimated using a Probit specification. The results were essentially the same as with OLS, so we chose the OLS specification to make coefficient interpretation easier. In Par£, the municfpios of Belim, Ananindeua, and Benevides were not used in the analysis because specification and OLS for the land value equation, Tobit for the investment equation, and Probit for the title equation (because title is a binary variable). In all'these equations, e represents an error term. As shown in Equation (1), having title increases land value, and hence, should affect the demand for title, as reflected in Equation (2) through the change-invalue variable. This variable, however, is not directly observable in either of our data sets. Accordingly, we introduce a constructed variable for the expected change-in-value from having title, calculated from Equation (1): we take the difference in the antilogs of the Value equation when Title equals one and zero, and this expression contains both exogenous variables and investment. Because of simultaneity between title and investment, we use a two-stage procedure to estimate those variables. 24 Predicted investment is used to calculate the change-in-value variable, and predicted title is used to estimate investment in Equation (3). The two-stage procedure addresses possible correlation of the errors in the investment and title equations. Because title and investment are both in the value equation, there is the possibility of correlated shocks across the equations; accordingly, we performed the Breusch and Pagan (1980) test for correlation in the error terms in all three equations and found none. 25 Based on these results, estimating the land value equation with OLS yields consistent results.
Land Value
The rationale behind Equation (1) is as follows: Land is an input to agricultural production. Its derived value is a function of supply factors, primarily the amount of available land, and demand factors, which include population they are primarily urban areas.
24. The two-stage procedure introduces the problem of biased standard errors. Where we corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) consistent estimator of the covariance matrix, the problem is addressed. However, where no heteroskedasticity existed, we adjusted the standard errors following .
25. The Breusch and Pagan (1980) technique involves a Lagrange multiplier test for correlation between the error terms of the model equations. The chi-square statistics for Para and Parana were all well below the critical value. density, agricultural productivity, the net prices of agricultural output (gross agricultural prices less transportation costs), and the nature of property rights to land. Productivity is determined by soil quality (inherent land productivity), past investment in improvements, and other characteristics such as land contours, access to water or irrigation, and the degree to which the land has been cleared of forest, which is a precondition for most agricultural activity. The effect of clearing on land value depends upon whether forests were considered valuable (Parana) or an impediment to farming (ParS).
Having title should increase demand and, hence, land values by reducing private enforcement costs, promoting investment, and expanding market exchange. Greater distance between the market center and the frontier should reduce demand and land values per hectare, because of increased transportation costs and lower net returns to farming. As illustrated in Figure l(a) , the effect of distance is different for titled and nontitled land. Up to some remote point, distance should have a greater negative effect on the value of titled land than on the value of nontitled land because of the contribution of title to value declines as the distance from the market center increases.
Accordingly, the estimated Equation (1) using the survey data contains the following variables. Value is the reported per-hectare value of a settler's farm. 26 Site dummies for S£o Felix, TailSndia, and Tucuma relative to the baseline of Altamira are included to account for the impact on land value of differences in soil quality or other site-specific variables, such as agency jurisdiction, that would affect the demand for land. We do not have information about differences in soil quality along the roads within each of the four sites where we interviewed. There are no indications, however, that soil quality differs importantly within each site. We include other demand variables-the extent of forest clearing, land-specific investment, the existence of title, and distance from the market center. Distance is reflected in two variables. The distance variable accounts for the expected negative effect that distance from the market center has on land values. The title-distance interaction variable reveals the effect that having title has on land value with respect to distance. The distance variable reflects the additional effect of distance on the value of nontitled land. Hence, we expect both coefficients to be negative, making the slope for the estimated line describing the value of the titled land larger in an absolute sense. The clearedland variable is the percentage of the farm that is cleared of forest. Investment is the percentage of the farm that is placed in pasture or permanent crops; this variable should capture the effect of past improvements on land value, leaving the exchange and enforcement effects on land value to be captured by the title variable.
The estimation of Equation (1) 32 municfpio population density; whether the municfpio was administered by a private land company or whether it was one of the municfpios contested between the state and federal governments (Parang); whether the municfpio was administered by INCRA or whether the municfpio was the site of conflict over land (Para) ; and the effects of distance from the market center on titled and untitled land values, introduced through an interaction term for distance and title.
We discuss the role of private land companies in the settlement of Parand below. Here we use dummy variables for the northern municfpios that were under the jurisdiction of the most important private land company, Companhia de Terras do Norte do Parana, to test whether the company was granted the 27. Land values for 1940 27. Land values for -1980 are from the Brazilian Agricultural Censuses, published by FBGE. The values arc those declared by the proprietor or administrator of the farm to the census interviewer. The agricultural census is done over the universe of agricultural establishments in each state and the results are presented aggregated at the municfpio or county level. The value of land in 1985 in Parf was not provided in the census. It was estimated by first calculating the ratio of land value to the value of farms (which included the value of investments, machinery, and animals) for 1970, 1975, and 1980 . The growth rates of this ratio were obtained and an average growth rate calculated. The 1980 ratio was then multiplied by this average growth rate to give the 1985 ratio, which in turn was multiplied by the 1985 agricultural farm value as provided in the census.
28. The census provides the proportion of municfpio farmers who occupy their land without title (squatters). Hence, our measure is one minus the proportion of farmers who are squatters.
29. In Section 5.3, we describe how the investment variable was created from the census data. 30. The distance between the municfpio capital and the state capital was calculated using maps. For Parti, the data are provided in a map, Republica Federative! do BrasiU Estado do Pard, Rodoviario, Politico e Estatistico, 3d ed., 1988, published by Editora Turistica e Estatistica Ltda, Goiania. The data are from DER (Deparlamento Estadual dc Rodagem) and from DETRAN (Departamento Nacional de Transito), respectively the state and national highway agencies. In Parti, the distances given are to Betem. Because of the importance of river transport in Parri, we used distance by river if this was less than the distance by road or if no roads existed. For Paranft, the distance variable was created from a map prepared by the state of Parand road department (DER) in 1966. The distances given are to Curitiba, the capital of the state, even though some municfpios in the north of Parana probably are more under the influence of the markets in Sao Paulo, which is closer. Lacking more complete information, we maintained the same market for all the municfpios in Parana.
31. Soil quality for each municfpio was constructed using the maps in Geografia do Brasil, Regiao Sul (vol. 2, p. 133) and Regiao Norte (vol. 5, , published by IBGE, Rio de Janeiro, 1990. The maps classify the potentiality of the soil for agriculture in five categories, considering fertility and topography. Each municfpio was assigned a number ranging from 1 to 5, increasing with the quality of the soil's potential.
32. The cleared-land variable was constructed by dividing the number of hectares of agricultural land cleared by the total amount of agricultural land in the municfpio. The area cleared was defined as the sum of the land in permanent crops, temporary (annual) crops, planted pasture, natural pasture, planted forest, and unused but usable land. These variables are defined by the agricultural most valuable land or whether it added extra infrastructure.
33 Additionally, we test whether conflict over land lowered values in those western municfpios in Paran£ that were characterized by jurisdictional disputes between the state and federal governments. 34 We test for similar jurisdictional and conflict effects in Para". Private land companies were much less important in the settlement of Para\ but the federal government may have claimed the best land along major highways and assigned the land to its agency INCRA. We assign a dummy variable for those municfpios under INCRA's jurisdiction. 35 As in Parana\ we expect that conflict over land would reduce land values. In the late 1970s and 1980s there was conflict in 44 of the 79 municfpios in our data set (Part Pastoral Land Commission, 1989) , especially in the southeastern part of Para\ For those municfpios we assign a dummy variable with the value of one. We do not have data on conflict for 1970 and 1975, although disputes likely were more limited at that time because of the early stage of settlement.
Title
Equation (2) contains both demand and cost variables for title as suggested by the analytical framework in Figure l (b) . For the survey data, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, taking the value one if the farmer had title and zero otherwise. For the census data, the dependent variable is the percentage of municfpio farmers who hold title to their land. In general, the demand for title should be a function of expected private net returns, which in turn are due to the increase in land value from having title less the private costs of obtaining title. Land values will increase with title because of a greater opportunity for investment in land improvements, greater exchange opportunities for land sales, and reduced private enforcement costs. The private costs of securing title, and hence demand, also will be affected by the requirements of the land 33. The dummy variable for the municfpios in which Companhia de Terras do None do Parana allocated land was created using the map in Nicholls and Paiva (1969: 28) . By examining IBGE maps (DT-SUEGE DEGEO/DIATA) that designate municfpios, it is possible to identify which municfpios are included in the company's holdings. These areas then can be projected forward to 1970 and extended back to 1950 and 1940 to identify the municfpios involved.
34. Determination of whether a municfpio was involved in government jurisdictional disputes is based on discussion of Parang settlement in Westphalen, Machado, and Balhana (1968) . These authors clearly define 11 municfpios where there were disputes in the 1950s between the federal and state governments. They also indicate that such conflicts were long-standing and not settled until the mid-1960s, although they do not identify the contested municfpios in earlier or later years. Due to subdivision, the number of municfpios in Parana grew over time. In the estimation, we traced the municfpios as identified in the 1960 census back to 1950 and 1940 and extended them forward to 1970. Of the 49 municfpios that existed in 1940, 1 was classified as private and 3 as having jurisdictional conflict. In 1950, of 80 municfpios, 8 were private and 4 were in the disputed area. In I960, there were 162 municfpios in Parana, with 29 having private land company holdings and 11 being in the disputed area. By 1970, there were 288 municfpios, with 49 having large private company holdings and 61 being within the area of jurisdiction confusion.
35. According to Brazilian law, municfpios were considered as being under INCRA's jurisdiction if the capital of the municfpio was within 100 km of a federal highway.
laws, such as beneficial use, occupation, boundary marking, and documentation. Unfortunately, we do not have systematic census or survey data on these factors. Additionally, costs will be an increasing function of distance due to the higher costs of traveling to and from remote farm sites to the administrative center and surveying and recording claims.
For the survey data we have the distance in kilometers from each farm to the local community and land office site, which is the city of Altamira for the Altamira colony, the city of Tucuma for the TucumS and Sao Felix colonies, and the city of Taila^idia for the Tail&ndia colony. For the census data, we have evidence on the distance from the municfpio capital to the main administrative center, which is the state capital (Curitiba in Parang or Bele"m in Pard). Other demand variables, for which we have some data include the size of the farm (average farm size in the municfpio for the census), the characteristics of the individual farmer, and the expected change in land value from having title.
Because private enforcement costs are likely to be higher for large farms or ranches, we expect that larger average farm sizes would increase the demand for title, hence the sign of the coefficient is anticipated to be positive. Although we test for the effects of farm size in the estimation that uses census data, we do not include farm size in the demand for title in the estimation using the survey data because the sampled farms are all uniformly small. Both formal colonization projects for small farmers and invasions by squatters of a particular area lead to a clustering of small farms in the Amazon with few neighboring large farms or ranches. 36 For example, the four sites we sampled are made up almost totally of small landholders: 80 percent of the 206 farmers in the survey had less than 100 hectares, and 93 percent had less than 200 hectares. Among small landholders in the Amazon there is comparatively little conflict. In our survey, small farmers repeatedly stated that their claims were "safe," indicating that there were few private enforcement costs that would differ by farm size.
There are several reasons why there are few disputes over land claims among small holders (small landholders). One is that the land is in beneficial use. Landholders with 200 hectares or less use much of their land to earn a nearly subsistence living for their families. Their plots are either in full production or are gradually being cleared at a rate of three to five hectares per year. 37 Further, since small farmers typically occupy their land, they can observe intrusion by neighbors or other squatters on their small holdings. Land claims are marked with cleared boundaries and planted trees, often cashews. Finally, small holders in an area organize groups to lobby the local land offices to provide formal 36. Although this is the general case in Parf, there are a few municfpios where federal subsidies for ranching under SUDAM were also attractive for squatting. These areas are characterized by both large ranchers and small landholders, and these counties, not surprisingly, are where violence occurs. See Alston, Libecap, and Mueller (1996) . These municfpios are included in the estimations based on census data. 37. Field notes by Ricardo Tarifa, May 18, 1993, for Tucuma.
titles. 38 These collective actions create a sense of cohesion or community among small holders that promotes recognition of individual land claims.
39
There are occasional disputes between adjacent small holders over the location of boundary lines or the drift of cattle and between small holders and loggers, who trespass to harvest valuable timber species. Both our survey responses and the land dispute records of FTERPA and the Pastoral Land Commission in Brasflia, however, clearly indicate that disagreements among small holders over property rights are resolved routinely.
With regard to individual characteristics, the survey data include each landholder's time on the plot, age, education, and wealth (value of livestock). The census data include the average age, income, and education in the municfpio for the 1980 census year only. 40 As proxies for experience, education, and income or wealth, age and time on the farm could both increase the demand for title and reduce the private costs of obtaining title. Individuals with greater experience, education, and income or wealth may be better able to take advantage of having title and to realize the extra returns made possible by it, and they may understand better the political process and bureaucratic requirements, enabling them to secure title at lower private cost. 41 Hence, the estimated coefficients on these characteristics variables should be positive.
The final demand variable is the expected change in value from having title. The change in land value from having title should affect the individual demand for title, as indicated in Figure 1 (b) . We have no direct evidence for this variable for either the census or the survey estimations, and construct the change-in-value variable from Equation (1) as described above.
The cost of obtaining title will also be affected by jurisdictional issues, which in terms of Figure l(b) would be shown by shifts in the threshold distance E. For the survey estimations, the jurisdictional effects are represented with site dummy variables to capture agency and other site-specific factors that might affect the private cost of title. The site variables represent shifts with respect to Altamira, the baseline. We chose Altamira as the baseline because it was a showcase INCRA settlement. An early colonization site along the TransAmazon highway, Altamira was established when INCRA had large budgets that 38. The role of sindicatos and church groups in squatter efforts in the Amazon are well known. Similar activities were undertaken by local claims clubs in the U.S. in the nineteenth century.
39. A discussion of local "networks" and corresponding recognition of individual land claims is provided in Ricardo Tarifa's field notes, May 18, 1993, for Tucuirai. For a discussion of local enforcement of property rights in a different context, see Ellickson (1991) .
40. Before 1980, socioeconomic data are presented at the state level only, not by municfpio. 41. We considered whether cleared land was an explanatory variable that affects the costs of obtaining title. The farmers we surveyed in ParS indicated that having title had little impact on their clearing activity. Additionally, they claimed that clearing did not promote title. According to them, in a densely forested region such as the Amazon, everyone must clear as a precondition to engaging in any agricultural activity. Including clearing as an explanatory variable in the title equation revealed no significant impact, nor did title have a significant impact on clearing. With regard to the wealth variable, ideally, a wealth measure would include other assets, but we do not have such data. Moreover, among frontier settlers with few assets, livestock are an important source of wealth. allowed it to provide title at low private cost, so we expect that settlers close to the market will have title in that colony. Tucuma is another INCRA site, but it was placed under the agency's jurisdiction late, after budgets had declined, reducing INCRA's capability to process titles; this factor may have raised the private costs of obtaining title in that colony. Landholders in the ITERPA areas of Tailandia and Sao Felix may be more likely to have titles than those at Altamira, because of the aggressive actions of ITERPA to subsidize the provision of titles to small holders in exchange for political support and the closer proximity of ITERPA headquarters in Bele"m.
For the census estimations, we include dummy variables for the western municfpios in Parana, where there were conflicts between the state and federal government over which government had authority to grant title. This factor likely would raise the private costs of obtaining title and should lead to a negative estimated coefficient for the government dispute variable. In addition, in ParanS private land companies played an important role in settlement and the provision of title. Because the private land companies were residual claimants for increases in land value from providing title, we anticipate that they would provide title at lower cost to claimants. Hence, those municfpios under privatecompany jurisdiction would have more titles, on average, leading us to predict a positive coefficient for the jurisdiction variable in Parana. In the census estimations, the northern municfpios under the jurisdiction of the private land company, Companhia de Terras do Norte do Parana, are indicated with dummy variables.
For the census estimations in Para\ we add two variables. One is also a jurisdictional dummy variable. Private land companies have been less important in that state, but, as described above, the federal and state governments had different land agencies (INCRA and ITERPA, respectively), which had separate jurisdictions. We expect that the state agency, ITERPA, with local constituencies and headquarters in nearby Bele"m would be more responsive to local demands for title and would provide title at comparatively lower private cost. Accordingly, the municfpios under ITERPA's jurisdiction would be titled more extensively than would those under the federal agency, INCRA, which had national constituencies and was headquartered in more distant Brasilia. In the equation, INCRA municfpios are represented with a dummy variable with a value of one, zero otherwise. As a result, the estimated coefficient on the INCRA variable is predicted to be negative. The second variable, violent conflicts, is used to identify those municfpios in Par£ characterized by violent conflict over land between ranchers and squatters. We view this conflict as a demand variable, because the returns to secure title would be particularly large in areas where ownership was uncertain. Accordingly, we anticipate a positive coefficient for the violence variable.
Land-specific Investment
The rationale for Equation (3) is as follows: investments in land improvements will be made on the basis of expected returns, which in turn are a function of the private costs of investment and the increase in farm revenue that results from the investment. For the survey estimations, investment is measured as the portion of the farm placed in improved pasture and permanent crops. Preparing pasture and planting permanent crops-such as cacao, coffee, pepper, and citrusrepresent the most important investments made by the small holders in our sample. Most costs are labor devoted to improving pasture (building fences, chopping brush and weeds) and planting and tending permanent crops. Using the census data, we calculate the average land-specific investment per hectare in the municfpio by deleting livestock and other mobile agricultural investments from a broad census investment variable. The agricultural census provides a combined variable that includes the value of land and investment in buildings, fences, corrals, equipment, and animals. Since the census provides seperate data on land value and livestock, we can remove land and livestock values to get an overall land-specific investment variable.
42
Expected returns from investment depend upon livestock and commodity prices, transportation costs, and land quality. Distance from the market should reduce the expected returns from investment by raising transportation costs. For the survey estimations, site dummies with respect to Altamira are used to control for site-specific differences, such as soil quality, in the private returns to investment. Distance is given as kilometers from the market center to the farm. For the census data, distance is distance between the municfpio capital and the major state market center, Curitiba in Parand and Bele'm in Part. Average soil quality in the municfpio is included. Although livestock and commodity prices generally do not vary across municfpios for any census period, transportation costs are different across the sample. To determine whether investment was reduced by conflicts in an area, we add dummy variables for those municfpios in Parand and Pard where conflict occurred and where property rights were uncertain, even with title. Moreover, private land companies in Parang and IN-CRA in Para provided some subsidies for permanent crops, fertilizers, and other infrastructure, which may have raised the net private returns from investment; we control for these effects with dummy variables for the municfpios involved.
The private costs of investment include the costs of capital plus the costs of the actual investment Access to and the cost of funds to purchase inputs for investment depend in part on whether the farmer has title and thus can use the farm as collateral. Having title also provides more security for longterm investments. For the survey data, a dummy variable is included to indicate whether or not the farmer has title. For the census data, title is represented by the percentage of farmers in a municfpio who hold title. Title should provide greater security for long-term investment in pasture and permanent crops and assist in accessing credit. Human capital variables such as age, education, wealth, and 42 . Livestock values for 1985 were not provided by the census, but were estimated by multiplying the number of animals (as given) by estimated prices. The prices were calculated by dividing the value of sales for each category (as provided in the census) by the number sold. Values for Parana were converted to 1970 cruzeiros, those for Para to 1985 cruzeiros. The price index used was the {ndice General de Pre^os calculated by Fundac,ao Getiilio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro. The investment amount was then divided by the amount of agricultural land in the county, as provided in the census. time on the farm, which are available from the survey, also should raise the expected returns from investment. Those with greater education should be more aware of market conditions and how to respond to them. Personal wealth may increase an individual's ability to obtain additional funds for investment. Age and time on the farm may reflect greater farming experience. Table 2 contains the estimated coefficients and r-statistics for the estimations of Equations (1), (2), and (3) using the survey data. Tables 3 through 5 contain the results of the estimations made using the census data.
Empirical Results
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Survey Data
Column 2 of Table 2 provides the estimation of Equation (1) for the determinants of land value using OLS and a log-linear specification. The site dummies in the equation account for the differences within each region that might affect land value, such as soil quality. Hence, the intercepts can be different for different sites. The results indicate that land values are higher at TucumS than at the base line of Altamira, and soil conditions are known to be relatively good at Tucum5 (Butler, 1985) . The estimated values per hectare are $34.12, $148.41, $28.22, and $21.76 for Altamira, Tucuma, SSo Felix, and Tail §ndia respectively. 44 As predicted, the effect of title on land value is positive and significant. Because we have controlled for the impact of investment the title variable largely reflects the gain in value due to increased exchange opportunities and lower private enforcement costs.
The log specification of the model implies that the percentage increase in land value due to having title will be the same across all of the sites, holding distance constant. If distance is zero-that is, the farm is at the market center, where values and competition for control are potentially the greatest-the estimated coefficient suggests that title would raise values by 189 percent. 45 Similarly, at a distance of 40 kilometers, land values would be increased by 72 percent.
46
This estimated increase in value is consistent with the actual observations. For instance, for farms in the range of 20 to 39 kilometers from the market, actual 43. We did not pool the census data for two reasons. One was that we wanted to examine changes across time, which can be best illustrated by comparing the individual census year runs. Furthermore, there are problems with pooling the Paranfi data in particular, because the number of municfpios, and hence observations, changes across time from 49 to 288. This increase in the number of municfpios took place through subdivision of municfpios, so the observation base is not the same across time. Additionally, for Pari we do not have information on all of the variables across time. In the estimations for 1970, one record for Parf is lost due to a negative value for investment, giving 78 observations. 44. The estimated values are drawn directly from the site dummy coefficients: e 3 ' 33 = 34.12, <r>-«+' « = 148.41, P-Sl-o 19 = 28 _ 22i and ^3-0.45 = 21 76 45. The change in land value is e' ^ -1, or 189 percent Although the coefficient 1.06 represents an approximation of the percentage change in the land value due to having title, the magnitude of the coefficient makes it a less accurate approximation. Accordingly, it is preferable to calculate directly the percentage change in value due to having title.
46. The change in land value with title is <•' 06 -° l4fln "'«<"•«) -I, or at 40 km, 72 percent. land values per hectare for titled land are 71 percent higher than those for nontitled land. 47 The regression predicts that at a distance of 140 kilometers, land values would be 45 percent higher for titled land. Actual observations for all farms 140 kilometers or more away from market reveal a 35 percent difference in land value between titled and nontitled land.
Title also affects the slope of the estimated relationship between land value 47. Alston, Libecap, and Schneider (1995) have the responses of 14 settlers in Tucuma who report increases in land value with title that range from 0 percent to 100 percent. All of these settlers, however, are remote from the market center in TucumiL Hence, a 189 percent increase in value is conceivable when distances are zero. and distance. The estimated coefficients for the distance and title-distance interaction variables indicate that a 1 percent increase in distance from the market leads to a 0.37 percent decline in the value of titled land. 48 The estimated impact of distance on nontitled land is negative, with a 1 percent increase in distance reducing land value by 0.23 percent.
As distance from the market center increases, values for titled and nontitled land fall. The results suggest that, as predicted, the decline in value with distance is greatest for titled land. Hence, at some point the two estimated relationships meet. Using the estimated coefficients for title and the title-distance interaction, we can solve for the distance where values for land with title equal those for land without title. In the case at hand, the distance is 1,942 kilometers, which is beyond any of our sampled locations. 49 Hence, having title provides some value to all the small holders in our sample.
Agricultural investment in permanent crops and pasture has the predicted positive effect on land values: a 1 percent increase in the percentage of farm land in pasture and permanent crops results in a 0.97 percent increase in value per hectare. Clearing also has a statistically weak, positive effect on land value: a 1 percent increase in the percentage of the farm that is cleared yields a 0.58 percent increase in value per hectare.
Column 3 of Table 2 provides the estimation of Equation (2) for title for the pooled sample with a Probit model, where title is a binary variable, one if the individual had a definite or provisional title, and zero otherwise. 50 The estimation is reasonably accurate as a predictor, correctly predicting the existence of title in 84 percent of the cases and correctly predicting no title in 53 percent of the cases. 51 The lower prediction success for the absence of title reflects the aggressive titling practices of the state land agency, ITERPA, in S3o Felix and TailSndia, where low-valued, remote land claims are granted title for political reasons.
The regression also tends to overpredict title; that is, we predict a title for 144 settlers while only 127 have title. This result suggests that the government titling agencies do not exactly follow the process outlined in the analytical framework in Figure 1 . We describe governments as providing title when individual calculations of private net benefit lead claimants to demand formal recognition of their claims. We recognize, however, that political and bureaucratic factors-48. This result is obtained by adding the coefficient for the title-distance interaction to the estimated coefficient for the distance variable, that is, -0.14 + (-0.23) = -0.37.
49. We solve for the distance by setting the two estimated lines equal to each other. Dividing the estimated coefficient for title by the estimated coefficient for the title-distajice interaction (1.06/0.14) gives 7.57, ande" 7 = 1,942 km.
50. Some farmers have a provisional title, rather than a final or definitive title. A provisional title may be issued while final processing of the title application takes place. Based on the survey of settlers and discussion with land agency officials, we view provisional and definitive titles as essentially the same, and we treat them as equals in the analysis. When the equation reported here is estimated using definitive titles only, the results essentially are the same.
51. The regression correctly predicts 42 of 79 farms without title and 107 of 127 with title. Overall, the regression correctly predicts 149 out of the sample of 206, or 72 percent. such as constituent lobbying, election pressures, budget allocations, and staffing levels-will affect the government response. How the government responds will influence the private costs of obtaining title and hence shift the cost curve. We do not have sufficient information about agency titling to effectively model the process or to include political variables in the regressions. We attempt to control for political differences associated with federal and state jurisdictions and land agencies, INCRA or ITERPA, through the site dummy variables. However, our results indicate that the problem of undertitling claimants who have comparatively highly valued land close to markets exists across the sites, at least to some degree. For example, there are plots in both Altamira and TailSndia that have reasonably high values and are near the market center but are not titled. 52 This problem is most pronounced in the INCRA community of Tucuma. INCRA's budget and staffing for processing claims have declined as the federal government has allocated budgets to other national issues (Yokota, 1981: 33; Schneider, 1994: 8) . The undertitling in Tucuma is reflected by the negative intercept, which indicates that settlers in Tucuma are less likely to have title than are settlers in the baseline site of Altamira or in the ITERPA colonies of S5o Felix and TailSndia. In the latter two colonies, the probability of having title does not differ significantly from that found in Altamira, where titling by INCRA initially was aggressive but now also is lagging (Moran, 1984: 291) . Mean distances from the market are 26 kilometers in Tucuma, 63 kilometers in Altamira, 153 kilometers in S3o Felix, and 45 kilometers in Tail&ndia. Mean land values are $237.34 per hectare in Tucuma, $59.66 in Altamira, $16.64 in S3o Felix, and $24.10 in Tail §ndia.
The undertitling by the federal agency, INCRA, in Tucuma and the overtitling by the state agency, ITERPA, in S3o Felix is demonstrated further by the following comparison. Based on the estimated coefficients evaluated at the means for each site and the cumulative normal density function, the predicted probability of having title in each area is 89 percent at Altamira, 32 percent at Tucum5, 59 percent at SSo Felix, and 73 percent at TailSndia. Alternatively, if settlers with the mean characteristics for each site were located in the baseline colony of Altamira, then the predicted probability of having title is 96 percent for Tucuma, only 46 percent for S3o Felix, and 75 percent for Tailindia.
53
The role of political and bureaucratic variables in influencing agency response to demands for title also is indicated in the apparent overtiming in SSo Felix and Tail §ndia by the state agency ITERPA, whose agents in some cases have handed out titles prior to local elections. By granting titles in remote locations prior to election, the agency appears to have lowered the private costs of obtaining title. However, the social costs of providing title to these low-valued sites may 52. In Altamira, there are at least two plots with reasonably high per hectare land values that arc only 12 and 13 kilometers from the market, but neither fanner has title. Similarly, in Tail&ndia there are two plots that have values above the mean price per hectare but are not titled.
53. For the alternative probabilities of having title, each site was estimated as though the settlers were in Altamira. Following Greene (1993: 696-98) , the dummy variables for the sites other than the baseline were set to zero. be quite high, and those costs are not completely internalized by the agency. 54 For the human capital variables, only time on the farm makes a statistically significant contribution to having title, although education comes close. Those who have been on their claim longer are more likely to understand the requirements of the land agencies and to meet their requirements. For instance, evaluated at the means, the marginal increase in the probability of having title given a one year increase in time on the farm is 0.8 percentage points in Altamira, 1.6 in Tucuma, 1.7 S3o Felix, and 1.5 in Tail §ndia. Changing the mean number of years by one-half standard deviation raises the probability of having title by 4.3 percentage points in Altamira, 2.0 in Tucuma, 4.6 in S3o Felix and 3.8 in Tailandia. 55 Similarly, evaluated at the means, the marginal increase in the probability of having title given a one year increase in education is 1.6 percentage points in Altamira, 3.0 in Tucuma, 3.2 in S3o Felix, and 2.8 in TailSndia. Changing the mean number of years of education by one-half standard deviation raises the probability of having title by 1.6 percentage points in Altamira, 4.1 in Tucum3, 2.3 in S5o Felix, and 2.3 in TailSndia. 56 Distance has the predicted negative effect on the incidence of title, probably because it raises the costs of obtaining title. Evaluated at the means, the marginal effects on the probability of having title given a one kilometer increase in distance is -0.1 percentage points in Altamira, -0.2 in Tucuma, -0.2 in SSo Felix, and -0.2 in TailSndia. Changing the mean distance by one-half standard deviation lowers the probability of having title by 2.7 percentage points in Altamira, 0.9 in TucumS, 4.2 in SSo Felix and 2.7 in Taila"ndia.
57
The expected change in land value from having title has the predicted effect on the incidence of title, although the significance level is low. The regression suggests that, evaluated at the means, the marginal increase in the probability of having title, given a $1 increase in the expected change in value due to title is 0.2 percentage points in Altamira, 0.3 in Tucuma, 0.4 in S3o Felix and 0.3 in Tail&ndia. Changing the mean change in value by one-half standard deviation raises the probability of having title by 1.3 percentage points in Altamira, 5.2 in Tucum5, 0.2 in Sao Felix and 0.8 in TailSndia. 58 Column 4 of Table 2 presents the estimation of Equation (3) for agricultural investment using a Tobit model. The regression shows that investment varies 54. Schmink and Wood (1992: 303) state that ITERPA handed out titles prior to local elections in 1982 as a means of generating political support. Our field surveyor argues that a similar process is anticipated in TailSndia: "The settlers that do not have a title are still waiting for ITERPA because these titles are in process. They told me that they are waiting for election time, when ITERPA issues titles for political interests" (field survey report of Ricardo Tarifa, May 12,1993) .
55. The standard deviations from the mean time on farm for Altamira, Tucuma, Sao Felix, and Tailandia are, respectively, 10.35, 2.51, 5.38, and 5.13. 56. The standard deviations from the mean years of education for Altamira, Tucuma, SSo Felix, and TailSndia are, respectively, 2.06, 2.72, 1.39, and 1.68.
57. The standard deviations from the mean distances for Altamira, Tucuma, Sao Felix, and Tailandia are, respectively, 50.27, 9.00, 37.76, and 28.52. 58. The standard deviations from the mean change in value for Altamira, Tucuma, SSo Felix, and Tailandia are, respectively, $15.36, $32.05, $1.26, and $5.12. considerably across the sites. The results suggest that settlers in Tucuma make greater investments in their land than do those in Altamira. Tucuma has the shortest mean distance to market for the four sites, and it is a relatively prosperous market town. The existence of title has a positive effect on investment. The effect of title on the percentage of farm land in pasture and permanent crops can be estimated, using the mean values for settlers at each of the four sites. The results suggest that the ownership assurance provided by title provides support for investment in costly fencing, other pasture development activities, and cultivation of permanent crops. In Altamira, having title adds 29 percentage points to the proportion of farm land in pasture and permanent crops. The mean proportion of land so devoted in Altamira is 25.5 percent. Similarly, in both Sao Felix and Tailandia, having title raises the share of farm land in pasture and permanent crops by 21 percentage points; in TucumiL, the increase is 48 percentage points. 59 The mean percentage of land in pasture and permanent crops in those sites is 7.3 percent, 12.1 percent, and 31.6 percent, respectively. Of those settlers who have pasture, the mean level of fencing is 1,181 meters, which represents an investment of approximately SSSO.
60 Accordingly, title plays a very important role in promoting investment in land improvements. By comparison, the human capital characteristics appear to have no impact on the private returns to investment.
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To summarize, the statistical tests using survey data support the analytical framework described in Figure 1 . Land value per hectare is a positive function of title. Moreover, distance reduces value differentially for titled and nontitled land. The contribution of title to land value is greatest at the market center, where competition and private enforcement costs would otherwise be the highest. The role of title, however, appears to decline with distance, as competition for control declines and production and exchange opportunities diminish. The estimations suggest that for all small holders in the sample, title always offers some added value. Whether or not it pays a settler to seek title depends upon the corresponding private costs of obtaining it. Land agencies influence those costs, with the state agency, ITERPA, appearing to provide title liberally, whereas the federal agency, INCRA, appears to be very slow in titling in the colony of Tucuma, where land values are relatively high and distances are comparatively short ITERPA is as likely to provide title to settlers in its remote colonies as is INCRA in its showcase and more accessible TransAmazon colony of Altamira. We find strong empirical support for the notion that formal property rights to land promote farm-specific investments, which in tum, raise land values directly. 59. Following Greene (1993: 696-98) and McDonald and Moffit (1980) , the effect of having title on investment was estimated by calculating the cumulative density at the means of each site. The result was used to scale the estimated coefficients.
60. Our field surveyor, Ricardo Tarifa, reported that 1,000 meters of fence cost approximately $500, including labor and wire, with poles being provided from the farm.
61. There may be a spurious relationship between investment (pasture) and our wealth measure, which is value of livestock. Hence, we do not draw strong conclusions about the variable.
Census Data
Tables 3 through 5 report the statistical analyses of the general forces underlying land values, the development of property rights to land, and land-specific investment across time using census data from the two Brazilian frontier areas. As noted earlier, the census estimations are performed using OLS, and a log-linear specification is used for the land value and investment equations. In general, the estimations perform better for the state of Parang than for Para", perhaps because of much lower land values in Para and other differences in frontier settlement between the two states such as the involvement of private land companies in the settlement of Parana" or the role of the government in subsidizing settlement in Pard.
6.2.1 Determinants of Land Value. As indicated in Table 3 , title and investment have the predicted positive effects on land value for seven of the eight census periods in the case of title and for all eight census years for investment; the estimated coefficient is statistically significant in all periods except 1985 for Para". For Parana\ title has a significant impact at the 90 percent level or better in two of the four periods, but the variable never has that statistical punch for Par<L The impact of title on land value is captured partially by the investment variable, so the title variable in Equation (1) reflects the gain in value due to increased exchange opportunities and lower private enforcement costs. These results are consistent with the survey-based findings for the relationship between land value and title and investment The effect of title on land value tends to decline with distance from the market center: there is a negative coefficient for the title-distance interaction variable for seven of the eight census periods. The effect is weak, however, particularly for Para". For nontitled land, the effect of distance is negative as expected for Para" (although not significant), but it is positive for Parana". The other explanatory variables for land value tend to have the predicted signs, and generally have greater statistical significance for Parana^ where the overall regressions explain more of the variance. Greater population density, reflecting demand for land, leads to higher land values in at least five of the eight census periods. Municfpios under the jurisdiction of private land companies in Parana^ at least in 1950 and 1960 , and municfpios under INCRA in Para in 1980 Table 4 , jurisdictional conflict in Parand in the western municfpios over whether the federal or state government had authorization to issue titles reduced the proportion of farmers with title, particularly in the last three census periods. In Para", however, there is no observed difference between the proportion of farmers with title in those municfpios characterized by violent conflict over land from the proportion elsewhere in the state. INCRA municfpios may have had a smaller percentage of farms with title than elsewhere, but the census estimations reveal no significant effect. Recall that in the survey data, the INCRA colony of Altamira in ParS had extensive titling, whereas the INCRA colony of Tucuma, also in Para, appeared to be undertitled, given land values and distances to market. In Parana those municfpios under the jurisdiction of the private land company had a greater percentage of titled farms only in the 1970 census. As hypothesized, distance from the market/administrative center tends to reduce the portion of farmers with title, a finding that is consistent with the notion that administrative costs rise with remoteness. This result also is consistent with those based on the survey data. The distance variable is significant at the 95 percent level in four of the eight census runs. The relationship between farm size and title is mixed in both states. The estimated coefficient generally is positive, as predicted, but there is a census period in each state for which the effect is negative and significant. We had hypothesized that private enforcement costs would rise with farm size, thereby increasing the demand for title by large fanners. For the 1980 census in Para, we have socioeconomic measures by municfpio for age, income, and education. All three have a positive impact, but only age leads to greater titling at a statistically significant level. Finally, the expected change in value from having title has a positive effect on the incidence of title in five of the eight census periods, with the greatest statistical significance in two of the census periods in Pard. These results are consistent with those found for the survey data.
6.2.3 Determinants of Agricultural Investment. Table 5 provides the estimates for agricultural investment per hectare. Having title has the predicted positive impact in seven of the eight census periods and is statistically significant in six of those periods. This result underscores the role of title in promoting investment that is seen in the survey data. With regard to distance from the market, in the two cases where the coefficient is significant at the 95 percent level, the effect is to reduce investment. In most cases the variable is not significant, a result also identified with the survey data. Confused property rights associated with conflicting government jurisdictions over land in Parana appears to reduce investment in that state, especially in the 1940 census period. There is a similar weak effect for violent conflict in Para. The private land development companies that sold land to farmers in Parana and the federal agency, INCRA, that established colonies of settlers in Para provided infrastructure and some subsidies for investment, and the positive impacts of these practices are reflected in the regression results. For example, after its creation in 1971, INCRA provided a variety of subsidies, including housing, other infrastructure, and seeds to Amazon settlers in its colonies (Moran, 1981: 79-83) . Soil quality plays a positive and generally significant role in investment in Parana.
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Over time, the factors identified in Equation (3) contributed to the growth 62. As noted earlier, the performance of the soil-quality variable appears to be especially weak, giving expected results for Parana but negative results for Pars'. in investment in land in Parana (in constant 1970 cruzeiros) from Cr$31 per hectare in 1940 to Cr$453 in 1970. 63 Although the same forces appear to have been active in Para, the amount of investment in that state is considerably less than in Parana. For example, in 1980, per hectare investment in Part was Cr$79 (1970 cruzeiros), which was less than one-fifth the level in Parana in 1970. 64 6.2.4 Summary of Census Data Results. All in all, the predictions of the theory outlined in Figure 1 are supported by the empirical evidence drawn from the censuses between 1940 and 1985. In general, title and/or investment raised land values on both Brazilian frontiers across time. The independent effect of title on land value, however, tended to decline with distance from major market centers in Parana, while the distance effect on the value of titled land was not significant in Para. In both states, higher costs associated with greater distance from administrative centers tended to reduce the proportion of farmers in a municfpio with title, with the strongest results in Parti. Jurisdictional confusion as to which government had authority to issue titles also lowered titling on the frontier in Parana. Except for one census period, neither the private land company in Parana nor the federal agency, INCRA, in Para provided significantly different titling services from those provided elsewhere in the two states. The expected change in value from having title also generally had the predicted positive effect on the incidence of title in both states. As predicted, in most cases title led to more land-specific investment in both states across the census periods.
The results regarding the determinants and impact of property rights to land are similar for both the survey and census data. The revealed relationships provide empirical support for the analytical framework described in Section 3.
Concluding Remarks
There is a growing literature on both the roles played by institutions in economic behavior and the determinants of those institutions. In this study, we have examined the development and impact of the most basic institution for markets-secure property rights in the form of title to land. We focused on frontier settlements in Brazil, where property rights to land are being established as land values increase. The empirical analysis began with microlevel, individual observations from sample data from 1992 and 1993, which are appropriate for drawing conclusions about individual behavior. The microlevel analysis was supplemented with estimations that use aggregate census data with observations at the municfpio level for early frontiers in the state of Parana between 1940 and 1970 and for more recent frontiers in the Amazon state of Pard between 1970 and 1985. In both cases, the theoretical predictions generally are supported by the empirical analyses based on the two data sets. Most critically, title and investment 63. Brazilian Agricultural Census, Parana (1970: 252) . The values reported in the text are total farm investment in each state as we define it, divided by total farm area.
64. Brazilian Agricultual Census, Parana (1970: 252) and Para (1980: 282). contribute to land value, and title promotes farm-specific investment. Additionally, the expected change in value from having title appears to increase the incidence of title. Although we estimated this variable, the results are consistent with actual survey evidence for a subsample of the group. We asked 14 of the 54 fanners interviewed in Tucum5 to estimate how much of the change in land value was attributable to having title. Of those 14, 11 replied that title would raise their land values by at least 20 percent and 8 reported that title would increase their land values by 50 percent or more (Alston, Libecap, and Schneider, 1995) . The general consistency of the econometric results for both the survey and census data sets underscores the robustness of the theoretical predictions about the role of property rights in influencing investment and raising land values. Additionally, this case study of Brazilian frontiers provides evidence regarding the political and economic processes that underlie the demand and supply of title. These empirical results provide insights into the implications of property rights for economic behavior and the development of markets. This information adds to the growing literature on the new institutional economics and to the literature on economic development.
A basic tenet of the new institutional economics is that property-rights regimes affect economic behavior. Tenure institutions have the potential to create wealth by promoting investment, by reducing enforcement costs, and by extending the gains from trade. As a result, individuals have incentives to organize collectively for the provision of secure rights to valuable assets. Typically, these institutions are provided by the state, and political factors will influence how effectively the state responds to demands for property rights.
To date, there have been few opportunities to examine empirically the demand for and supply of property rights. This study has provided such an investigation. It has focused on the factors that affect the demand for title and the government response to those demands. By and large, the demand variables have performed as predicted. The political response, however, has not been consistent. Where government jurisdictions have been confused, as in Parana", title has been less prevalent. Further, the survey data in Para reveal that titling agencies for both the federal and state governments do not perform exactly as the economic framework predicts. Claimants to low-value, remote plots receive title, especially from ITERPA, prior to elections, whereas claimants to some more valuable plots near to markets are neglected, often due to budget and staff limitations. This phenomenon is particularly apparent for the INCRA colony of TucumS, where land values are high and distances are short, but titling is limited. Unfortunately, the problem exists elsewhere as well. These results suggest that researchers must pay special attention to the complex political and bureaucratic process by which property rights are assigned in studying the emergence of tenure institutions. Clearly, more work in modeling and testing hypotheses regarding the provision of property rights is warranted.
These results also are relevant for the development literature. At least in situations where no durable property structure has existed before (as in the case of frontiers), governments can increase economic performance and wealth by
